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We provide evidence of an association between audit partner rotation and the quality of earnings. We take advantage of a requirement for Australian firms that the signing (i.e., engagement) partner be identified by name in the annual report to identify the effect of audit partner tenure rather than audit firm tenure. Using a sample of 3,621 firm-years between 1998 and 2003, we show that audit partner changes most likely reflecting partner rotation (i.e., they are not due to a switch of audit firm) are associated with lower unexpected accruals, and that this relation is driven predominantly by smaller positive unexpected accruals following partner changes.
This result is consistent with more conservative reporting following a rotation of audit partner, and this interpretation is further supported by evidence suggesting a significant increase in the asymmetrically timely recognition of economic losses when firms have a change of audit partner. Our tests also show that these effects are much stronger for clients of Big 5 audit firms, and also that any effect is concentrated in the latter part of our sample period, when partner rotation was a professional requirement.
We therefore conclude that mandatory audit partner rotation is associated with incrementally greater conservatism in financial reporting, consistent with the arguments frequently offered in support of audit partner rotation as being a contributor to the quality of audit services and ultimately, the quality of financial reporting.
Introduction
As public concerns about instances of alleged accounting and audit failure have increased, so has the interest of political and regulatory organizations in the promulgation of rules relating to aspects of the auditor-client engagement. For example, attention has been given to aspects of the auditor-client relationship that may impact on auditor independence, whether in fact or in appearance. For example, the provision of non-audit services (NAS) is now severely restricted in many countries.
Likewise, the extent of the auditor's tenure has also been subject to regulatory intervention, on the basis that a lengthy tenure is likely to result in reduced independence, and hence a lower quality of auditing. Restrictions on auditor tenure can arise at two levels. First, there have been calls to restrict the length of time that an audit firm can audit a specific client, although this has largely been resisted, with explicit recognition of the potentially high costs of mandatory audit firm rotation. 1 Second, it has been alleged that key audit personnel, such as the engagement partner, should be periodically rotated off the audit. Consequently, requirements have been put in place that require the mandatory rotation of the partner most responsible for overseeing the audit (i.e., the engagement partner). 2, 3 This legislative intervention is despite pre-existing professional standards expressing the need to ensure at least some degree of partner rotation, as well as recent revisions to these standards which provide for partner rotation. In the case of Australia, the statutory requirement is now that rotation should occur no less than every five years. 4 However, perhaps of even greater concern is that both the regulatory and professional "push" to require a greater extent of audit partner rotation has occurred despite an almost complete absence of systematic evidence on the extent to which partner rotation has any impact on audit quality and ultimately, the quality of audited financial reports. Our paper addresses this concern.
We take advantage of a long-standing Australian requirement that requires the engagement partner to be named in the annual report. 5 We are able to identify instances of partner rotation (as distinct from just audit firm changes) and then examine the possible effect of partner rotation on the quality of earnings. By focussing our analysis on the period in which rotation applies, we attempt to isolate the impact of audit partner rotation on the quality of audited financial reports. In contrast to existing evidence, our paper provides some support for the view that audit partner rotation is associated with a reduction in relatively aggressive accounting. We initially find that in the year of rotation, firms are more likely to have lower signed unexpected accruals. When we estimate this relation separately for instances of positive and negative unexpected accruals, we find that while positive unexpected accruals are significantly lower following a partner switch, there is no discernible effect for instances where unexpected accruals are negative. This is consistent with audit partner rotation constraining relatively aggressive accruals, but having little impact on the extent to which unusually negative accruals occur. The findings are robust to alternative measures of unexpected accruals, as well as inclusion of a variety of control variables associated with variation in unexpected accruals.
One way of interpreting our results using unexpected accruals is that partner rotation is associated with more conservative financial reporting, and we further investigate this explanation by examining if partner rotation is associated with an increase in the extent to which earnings asymmetrically reflects the timely recognition of losses versus gains (i.e., "conditional" conservatism). 6 Given that most criticism directed at the effect of reduced auditor independence on the quality of financial data seems to be premised on instances of "overly aggressive" reporting, the assumption that the timeliness of economic loss recognition is an important attribute of earnings quality seems appropriate. We use the reverse regression approach outlined in Basu (1997) 5 Australian Corporations Act (2001) s.324(10). 6 Following Ball and Shivakumar (2005) , we use the term "conditional conservatism" to describe the asymmetrically timely recognition within income of economic losses as compared to economic gains. Other terms include "news-based" conservatism (Basu 1997) and "ex post" conservatism (Pope and Walker 1999).
and an accruals-based test suggested by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) to identify whether increased news-based conservatism is associated with audit partner rotation.
Our results are consistent with increased conservatism in the period in which auditor rotation occurs.
We also show that all of our primary results occur predominantly among clients of Big 5 audit firms. We are unable to discern any effect on accounting quality where clients of non-Big 5 audit firms have a new engagement partner. This supports concerns that have been expressed about the extent to which "one size fits all" requirements for audit partner rotation can be justified. Further, when we separate our data into observations pre-and post the initial reforms to Australian Professional Standard F1, we find that the effects of audit partner rotation are largely confined to the latter sub-period. 7 Heightened regulatory and political attention on issues of auditor independence generally, and partner rotation specifically, may have played a role in encouraging newly appointed engagement partners to adopt a more conservative stance.
Our evidence makes a number of contributions. First, we separately identify the effect of audit partner rotation, as distinct from measuring audit firm tenure, and subsequently distinguish rotations made by small and large audit firms. Second, we utilize multiple proxies for accounting quality (unexpected accruals and asymmetrically timely recognition of economic losses) that directly address the claims that audit partner rotation will constrain those instances where accounting may be viewed as "aggressive". Third, we control for the effect of audit firm size, which is expected to reflect variation in the extent to which auditor independence, and hence, audit quality is threatened (DeAngelo, 1981) . Finally, we provide evidence from periods both pre and post the recent changes to statutory and professional requirements related to audit partner rotation.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section two we briefly review key arguments and prior evidence on the possible relation between auditor independence, audit partner and audit firm tenure, and audit quality. We contrast the prior focus on length of tenure with our interest in identifying the contemporaneous effects associated with partner rotation. In section three we describe our data collection procedures and experimental design, as well as the proxies which we use to capture variations in the quality of audited financial reports (i.e., earnings quality). Section four reports our primary results, while section five summarizes several additional tests undertaken to ensure the robustness of our results. Section six concludes and considers some of the policy implications of this research.
Background

Rotation costs and benefits
As we have noted, arguments about the possible effect of auditor tenure on audit quality focus on the possible effect of lengthy tenure on auditors' independence. This argument can be applied at either the audit firm level, or with respect to the person or persons most responsible for planning and/or executing the audit. Typically, the argument is that auditor independence is adversely affected by the auditor's long term relationship with the client. Mandatory rotation of the audit firm, or of key personnel, is therefore argued to promote greater independence and consequently, higher quality auditing. This effect may be on independence in fact, or simply on independence in appearance. However, there are also costs attached to mandatory auditor rotation, and these costs are likely to be higher where it is the audit firm, rather than an existing partner, who is removed from the audit. Apart from direct financial costs associated with a new audit firm (i.e., an entirely new audit team) familiarizing itself with the client's business environment, internal controls and financial reporting policies, there are also the potential costs associated with reduced familiarity, namely a less competent and hence, lower quality audit. At the partner level, it can be argued that the costs associated with a change are considerably less, as the audit team may continue largely unchanged, but with overall direction and responsibility being done with "fresh eyes". It is therefore not surprising that regulatory reform (including revised professional standards) has focussed on the imposition of mandatory partner rotation, rather than mandatory audit firm rotation.
However, any identifiable association between audit engagement partner rotation and attributes of accounting quality is premised on the assumption that there will be some difference in a "new" partner's perspective, and that this will materially impact on the financial statements. At least two considerations work against this assumption, namely the absence (in general) of a specific need for the engagement partner to impose additional "restrictions", and the extent to which audit partners within the same audit firm can be expected to take a similar point of view, be it from similar training, interaction, or reliance on audit firm-wide resources for resolving technical accounting issues. Ultimately, the extent to which such factors are likely to attenuate any expected effects of partner rotation is an empirical question. We are only able to observe the net effect of partner rotation, rather than the separate identification of costs and benefits.
Our examination of proxies for earnings quality reflects a maintained assumption that the quality of audited financial data is a joint product of the underlying attributes of management representations and audit quality. Our approach also reflects the model of audit quality proposed by DeAngelo (1981) , namely that audit quality is comprised of auditor competence (i.e., the probability that an auditor will detect a breach) and independence (i.e., the probability that, having found a breach, the auditor will report it). Although this model indicates a specific role for auditor independence as part of the broader audit quality construct, it also serves to highlight that independence could play a second order role behind competence. In this case, the attention given to possible determinants of auditor independence such as auditor tenure could overstate its importance.
Prior evidence
Existing research examining the relation between auditor changes and the quality of financial reporting focuses almost exclusively on tenure of the audit firm, rather than the responsible partner. Several studies have examined the effect on measures of accounting quality associated with a switch of audit firm. For example, DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) show that firms which switch from Big 6 to non-Big 6 audit firms appear to implement more liberal accounting, as evidenced by higher unexpected accruals. However, this result does not distinguish between the effects of a change in audit firm per se, and the change in audit quality widely held to be associated with the Big 6/Non-big 6 distinction (Craswell, Francis and Taylor, 1995) .
More recent studies have focussed specifically on the length of the audit firm's tenure.
Johnson, Khurana and Reynolds (2002) Although measures of earnings quality suggest the effect of auditor tenure is positive, evidence on the effect of audit firm tenure on user perceptions is mixed. Ghosh and Moon (2005) find that earnings response coefficients increase with the length of audit firm tenure, consistent with earnings having a greater influence on equity prices as auditor tenure increases. They also find that the influence of earnings on Standard and Poors (S&P) stock rankings is increasing with the length of audit firm tenure.
However, they are unable to find any evidence of audit firm tenure impacting on the influence of earnings on S&P debt rankings. This result contrasts with the conclusions of Mansi, Maxwell and Miller (2004) , who find that increasing auditor tenure is associated with a higher S&P debt ratings. 8 Deis and Giroux (1992) review audit quality letters produced by a public audit agency and conclude that audit quality declines as tenure increases. However, Geiger and Raghunandan (2002) find that auditors become more efficient at collecting and evaluating audit evidence as tenure increases. Carcello and Nagy (2004) find that the probability of fraudulent financial reporting is highest early in the audit firm's tenure (i.e., the first three years), and is not significantly higher for instances of longstanding audit engagements. Finally, Myers, Myers, Palmrose and Scholz (2004) show that conclusions about the effect of audit tenure on the probability of financial restatements is generally weak, but for those restatements most likely to be regarded as "serious" there is a positive relation between tenure and the likelihood of such a restatement.
The mixed evidence on the effect of audit firm tenure could reflect the potentially competing effects of increased tenure. As we have already noted above, on the one hand the auditor (in this case the audit firm) is argued to become increasingly "familiar" with the client in a way that reduces auditor independence. On the other hand, newly appointed auditors face potentially higher information asymmetries in respect of the client firm's business models and accounting systems, which could increase the probability that audit errors will occur (i.e., reduced competence). Similar arguments apply to the possible effect of audit partner rotation, although to a lower degree.
In contrast to the extensive literature examining the possible impact of audit firm tenure on the quality (and perceptions thereof) of accounting, we are only aware of three studies that specifically examine the relation between accounting quality and audit partner tenure. Using Australian data for the period 1987-1993, as well as a cross section of data from 1995, Carey and Simnett (2005) examine the probability of a first time going concern opinion, the distribution of earnings (i.e., the extent of benchmark beating) and unexpected working capital accruals. They find some evidence of a negative relation between the probability of a going concern qualification and audit partner tenure, although this is not robust to restricting their tests to those firms most likely to receive a going concern qualification. In tests using either earnings distributions or unexpected accruals as a proxy for the effect of audit quality, Carey and Simnett find no evidence consistent with independence concerns.
However, in their tests of unexpected working capital accruals, Carey and Simnett "convert" their unexpected accrual measure into a simple binary variable, namely positive or negative unexpected accruals. In tests of benchmark beating with respect to either avoiding a loss or an earnings decline, tests are confined to comparing benchmark beating and "just miss" firms in terms of either partner tenure exceeding five years or being below that figure. In both cases, we believe this constitutes a relatively weak test of whether partner rotation leads to reduced earnings management, especially if a discernable effect is expected to occur around the time of partner rotation. The expectation that the effect of partner rotation should be evident around the time of such rotation is in marked contrast to the approach of Carey and Simnett, where it is assumed there is a monotonically increasing degree of earnings management as partner tenure increases. More generally, their data is exclusively drawn from a period which pre-dates recent concerns and legislative and professional actions directed at audit partner tenure. partner tenure may be misplaced, they do not separately examine instances of positive and negative unexpected accruals (i.e., they treat over and under accruing symmetrically). Of greater concern in the context of addressing the effect or partner rotation is that they exclude the first year of the incoming partner's engagement responsibility, despite the fact that the most marked effect of a rotation might be expected to occur at that time.
In contrast to extant research, our concern is whether partner rotation is associated with a contemporaneous change in the quality of audited financial data. If partner rotation represents a set of "fresh eyes", then from our perspective the key issue is whether such "fresh eyes" have an impact on the quality of financial reporting. As with other studies of the link between audit quality and the quality of audited financial data, we use a measure of unexpected accruals as an initial proxy for accounting quality. However, given that most, if not all the arguments in favour of partner rotation typically focus on the alleged increase in aggressive accounting as partner tenure increases, we also extend our analysis to examine whether the extent to which audited accounts differentially reflect economic losses (i.e., bad news) also varies contemporaneously with partner rotation.
Data and method
Measuring accounting quality
In order to examine whether audit partner rotation is associated with variation in accounting quality, we require a suitable proxy for variation in accounting quality. We initially rely on a measure of the extent to which the accrual component of annual income is greater or less than expected. Following the arguments and evidence in Kothari et al. (2005) , we estimate the magnitude of performance adjusted unexpected accruals. We adjust for performance by including lagged ROA (Ashbaugh et al. 2003) . 11 The residual from the model provides our measure of unexpected accruals.
The model is estimated in cross-section for each industry code and for each year. 12 All variables (including the intercept) are scaled by lagged total assets. The model is estimated as: 11 For sensitivity we also utilize several alternative models to estimate abnormal accruals, namely the modified Jones model, the lagged model and the growth model (Dechow, Richardson and Tuna, 2003) . The results from tests using these measures are discussed in section 5. 12 For the purposed of this model, the original 24 ASX industries have been regrouped into 10 industries similar to the GICS coding. Detail of this coding is provided in Appendix I. We consider four specifications of our unexpected accruals measure. Our first measure is the absolute value of unexpected accruals as used in prior research (Becker et al., 1998; Frankel et al., 2002) . This measure ignores the direction but captures the overall magnitude of managerial intervention in the accounting process. However, most, if not all of the recent high profile examples of allegedly fraudulent accounting and associated audit failures have been instances where it is alleged that income has been overstated. Hence, much of the anecdotal evidence on which proponents of mandatory partner rotation draw is not consistent with a symmetric measure of accounting manipulation such as the absolute value of unexpected accruals. We therefore also test the relation between audit partner rotation and signed unexpected accruals, and then further refine this test by separately testing instances where unexpected accruals are positive and negative respectively.
We estimate the following model to examine the relation between audit partner tenure and the various measures of unexpected accruals: shown to be associated with variation in earnings quality. Consistent with extant earnings management research (Fields et al., 2001 ), we also include controls for firm size and incentives to manage earnings such as leverage, the extent of institutional ownership and certain types of corporate activity (i.e., equity issuance and mergers).
Finally, we include controls for firm growth, contemporaneous cash flow, market returns, lagged total accruals and a dummy variable for instances of loss reporting.
Although our tests using unexpected accruals include separate analysis of instances where unexpected accruals are either positive or negative, such tests do not directly show whether partner rotation is associated with more or less conservative accounting. By earnings conservatism, we refer to the asymmetrically timely recognition of economic losses within income relative to economic gains. Relative to criticism directed at instances of overly aggressive accounting, it may be argued that conservative accounting is consistent with higher quality accounting (Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper, 2005) . We therefore investigate the relation between partner rotation and earnings conservatism. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) note that conservatism in financial reporting can occur in two quite different ways. First, financial reporting can occur taking a consistently unfavourable view of uncertainties and hence, the minimization of net assets and income. They describe this as "unconditional" conservatism, and argue that the inclusion of an unconditional bias in financial reports of a known magnitude is unlikely to enhance the contracting role of financial reporting. On the other hand, conditional conservatism, or what Basu (1997) describes as the asymmetrically timely recognition of bad economic news, is argued to be consistent with the contracting demand for financial reporting and hence, a contributor to the "quality" of financial reporting. For example, as Watts (2003) notes, conditional conservatism is likely to reduce the probability of inappropriate distributions to claimholders by facilitating the earlier triggering of debt covenants, as well as generally restricting managerial actions in the face of economic losses.
We utilize two alternative methods for identifying the extent of conditional conservatism (hereafter simply "conservatism") and its variation around the time of partner rotation. Our first test utilizes a reverse regression of annual earnings on contemporaneous stock returns (Basu, 1997) . 13 The timeliness of earnings is inferred from the responsiveness of accounting income to changes in market value.
Conservatism implies that accounting income asymmetrically reflects economic news. 14 Timeliness is measured by the slope coefficient and overall explanatory power in a "reverse" regression with annual earnings as the dependent variable (Beaver, Lambert and Morse, 1980) . Negative market-adjusted stock returns are used as a proxy for bad news and positive returns are used as a proxy for good news. 15 We include additional intercept and slope coefficients to capture the incremental effect of partner rotation, and estimate the following regression: 13 Other studies that use this approach include Pope and Walker (1999), Ball et al. (2000) , Ball, Robin and Wu (2003) and Givoly and Hayn (2000) . 14 Under the efficient market hypothesis, stock prices efficiently reflect value-relevant information received about a firm. Stock prices reflect information received from sources other than current earnings. Stock prices have been shown to lead accounting earnings by up to four years (Beaver, Lambert and Morse 1980; Kothari and Sloan 1992) . 15 In addition to annual market adjusted stock returns measured over the contemporaneous fiscal year, we also reperform our analysis using stock returns measured with a lag of 3 months, to allow for the reporting of annual results. Use of this alternative return metric yields quantitatively similar results.
OI
= Operating income in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1 DRET = 1 if MRET in year t is less than 0; else = 0 MRET = Fiscal year share return adjusted for the All Ordinary Index in year t PSWITCH = 1 if partner switch (within audit firm) has occurred in the current year; else = 0
If audit partner rotation is associated with improved conservatism, then we would expect the coefficient for β 3 to be positive and statistically significant, consistent with the incrementally higher responsiveness of earnings to bad news (i.e., a positive value for β 1 ) being increased where partner rotation has occurred.
However, the tests of conservatism using the reverse regression approach of Basu (1997) are not without shortcomings. For example, Gigler and Hemmer (2001) argue that firms with more conservative accounting are less likely to make timely voluntary disclosures, so that contemporaneous stock returns are expected to provide a more timely reflection of economic news for firms with less conservative accounting. Dietrich et al. (2002) argue that a clear interpretation of equation (2) is only possible if returns cause earnings, and not the reverse. An alternative approach to measuring the extent of conditional conservatism is suggested by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) .
This approach reflects the likelihood that timely loss recognition occurs through accruals, rather than cash flows. Although a primary function of much of the accrual process (especially working capital accruals) is to produce a periodic performance measure that is less noisy than cash flow from operations (Dechow, 1994) , a second role of accruals is to provide timely recognition of economic gains and losses.
However, the contracting role of accounting is much more likely to demand the timely recognition of economic losses, and so an asymmetry is expected. In contrast to the If partner rotation is associated with a contemporaneous increase in conservatism, we expect the positive correlation between operating cash flow and accruals attributable to conservatism will be exacerbated at the time of partner rotation. Thus we expect the coefficient for β 3 to be positive and statistically significant.
Data
Our sample consists of 3,621 Australian stock exchange (ASX) listed firm-years from Leverage is the only characteristic that is statistically different between the groups using either parametric or non-parametric tests. Firm-years where audit partner rotation has occurred have lower leverage than non-rotators. Although a comparison of means suggests that larger firms are more likely to rotate auditors, it is apparent that this reflects a greater degree of skewness in the distribution. Table 3 reports the findings from our unexpected accrual tests. The first column reports results using the absolute value of unexpected accruals. These results suggest that audit partner rotation has no discernible effect on the magnitude of unexpected accruals. In contrast to earlier research (Becker et al., 1998; Francis and Krishnan, 1999) , we find that the absolute value of unexpected accruals is significantly higher for Big 5 auditees. However, the majority of our other control variables are consistent with prior research (Fields et al., 2001 ). Turning to signed unexpected accruals, our results change markedly. In the results reported in the second column of Table 3 , we find that partner rotation is associated with significantly lower (i.e., more negative) unexpected accruals, consistent with newly appointed engagement partners enforcing relatively more conservative accounting. On the other hand, we find no evidence of Big 5 auditors being systematically associated with larger or smaller unexpected accruals.
Results
Magnitude of unexpected accruals
Given the differing results in tests using absolute and signed unexpected accruals, we further investigate by confining our tests to observations that have positive and negative unexpected accruals. 17 These results are reported in columns 3 and 4 respectively of Table 3 . In column 3, we report that partner rotation is significantly negatively associated with positive unexpected accruals. Instances of positive unexpected accruals can be interpreted as those cases where accounting is relatively aggressive. Hence, our result suggests that when partner rotation occurs, it is more likely that instances of relatively aggressive accounting will be somewhat constrained.
On the other hand, when tests are confined to instances where unexpected accruals are negative (column 4), there is no evidence of partner rotation being associated with a significant variation in unexpected accruals. Hence, our results suggest that evidence of partner rotation being associated with lower signed unexpected accruals (i.e., column 2) is driven primarily by a reduction in those cases where accruals are relatively aggressive.
As instances where accruals are unexpectedly high likely include the most egregious examples of aggressive reporting (at least relative to the underlying economic position), it appears that partner rotation is most effective at reducing the extent of aggressive reporting. As the cases of apparent accounting abuses are largely, if not exclusively drawn from this subset, the results may be seen as providing some support for the argument that partner rotation serves to reduce such instances. Of course, this interpretation assumes that a contemporaneous reduction in the extent of positive unexpected accruals is a desirable attribute of accounting (i.e., it reflects higher quality accounting). One way of viewing this claim is to simply argue that increased conservatism is desirable, and that such an effect is most likely to arise as a result of audit partner rotation. We turn now to an explicit test of this hypothesis.
Incremental conservatism
Given that one interpretation of the results reported in Table 3 is that partner rotation is associated with more conservative accounting, we perform a direct test of whether conservatism is associated with partner rotation. Tables 4 and 5 report results of tests directed at identifying the extent to which earnings incrementally reflects economic losses relative to economic gains.
Panel A of Table 4 reports the initial results of the Basu (1997) timeliness regression.
We show the results for all firm-years, and then separately for firm years coinciding Table 4 we extend the timeliness model to include a partner switch intercept and additional interaction terms. This allows us to determine if partner rotation is specifically associated with incrementally differential timeliness of earnings. The coefficients of interest are β 2 and β 3 . Although the β 2 coefficient is negative but insignificant, the coefficient on β 3 is positive and statistically significant.
This suggests that earnings are more conservative in the year of partner rotation.
Because our test does not also control for audit firm size, Panels C and D reports the regression results for clients of Big 5 and non-Big 5 auditors respectively. Only clients of Big 5 auditors that rotate partner display more conservative earnings than non-rotating firms. Evidence that partner rotation is associated with increased conservatism is restricted to Big 5 clients. This lends some support to the argument that partner rotation should be applied differentially to clients of large and small audit firms. where partner rotation occurs, we find evidence consistent with accruals and cash flows being positively correlated when there is relatively poor economic news (i.e., the bad news coefficient (β 1 ) is positive and statistically significant).
In Panel B of Table 5 we report tests that extend these results to explicitly include the incremental effect on conservatism of partner rotation. For both the pooled sample as well as separate estimations restricted to either Big 5 or non-Big 5 auditors, we find evidence consistent with increased conservatism contemporaneous with partner rotation (i.e., the bad news coefficient specific to partner rotation years (β 3 ) is positive and statistically significant). With the exception of the results for non-Big 5 auditors being consistent with those for the Big 5, the Table 5 results are consistent with those reported in Table 4 . We therefore view the results as supporting the conclusion that partner rotation is associated with an incremental increase in the extent with which economic losses are asymmetrically reflected in income relative to economic gains.
Additional analysis
In order to enure the robustness of our results, we perform several additional tests.
These address the possible effects of our method of measuring unexpected accruals (and more broadly, earnings quality), the potential impact of professional requirements requiring audit partner rotation (introduced in 2001), longer term effects of partner tenure and the separation of partner and firm rotation effects.
Unexpected accruals and earnings quality
In our primary analysis summarized in section 3, we rely on unexpected accruals measured using a performance adjustment. There are at least three further popular methods for estimating unexpected accruals, namely the modified Jones model, the lagged model and the sales growth model as outlined in Dechow et al. (2003) .
Although Coulton et al. (2005) report evidence on the application of these models to Australian data, they do not compare these models with the performance adjusted approach which we use. Hence, we re-estimate unexpected accruals using each of these approaches, and re-perform the analysis reported in Table 3 . However, there are no substantive differences in the conclusions which follow from these tests. We also repeat our performance adjusted accrual tests excluding industries with less than 10 observations in each industry-year (Coulton et al., 2005) , and our results hold.
We also recognize that unexpected accruals are not the only method for estimating the likelihood of deliberate earnings management. Recent evidence (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997) has demonstrated that earnings distributions are skewed around alleged benchmarks such as zero earnings and last year's earnings (i.e., zero earnings change). 18 However, Coulton et al. (2005) show that among Australian firms, benchmark beaters do not appear to have high unexpected accruals relative to firms that "just miss" the relevant benchmark. While this may indicate that benchmark beating is a poor proxy for earnings management, a similar conclusion may be reached for the measure of unexpected accruals used in Table 3 . Hence, we also consider whether the probability of earnings just beating two key benchmarks (i.e., zero earnings and last year's earnings) is significantly reduced around the point at which partner rotation occurs. We classify firms as benchmark beaters if the increase in earnings or level of earnings is up to two percent of total assets. We compare benchmark beaters against firms that just miss this target, as well as against all firms who miss this target. Our logit model has similar control variables to that used for unexpected accruals in Table 3 . 19 While we find no evidence of a significantly reduced probability of avoiding a loss where partner rotation first occurs, we do find that the probability of just beating last year's earnings is significantly lower immediately after partner rotation. This result therefore supports our earlier evidence that partner rotation may constrain relatively aggressive accounting.
Pre-post F1 periods
As partner rotation has only been an Australian professional requirement since 2001, we repeat all of our analysis in Tables 3, 4 The results in Tables 6, 7 and 8 are generally consistent. In Table 6 , evidence of reduced unexpected accruals and the concentration of that result within those observations where unexpected accruals are positive only arises for the latter part of our sample period. In Table 6 , significant incremental conservatism at the time of partner rotation (as measured using the Basu (1997) method) only occurs in the latter part of the sample period. Likewise, the concentration of this result among clients of Big 5 auditors is also confined to this latter period. Using the accruals based method of Ball and Shivakumar (2005) , Table 8 shows that there is some evidence of incremental conservatism in both sub periods, although for Big 5 clients this is only apparent in the latter time period. Hence, it appears that evidence of partner rotation effects is not consistent across the entire sample period examined. For Big 5 clients, the association between partner rotation and earnings quality is primarily apparent only in the latter time period, coinciding with the introduction of professional requirements for mandatory partner rotation.
19 Full details of the tests and results are available from the authors.
Tenure length
As we find some evidence that partner rotation improves earnings quality, we are interested in the persistence of the effects. For these tests, we restrict our sample to firms that have maintained the same audit firm for at least six years. We repeat our tests on this restricted sample. We then incrementally increase the period from when partner rotation last occurred, so that the period defined as partner rotation moves from the year of the rotation to the year of rotation or the year following, and so on.
We do not detect any significant relation between partner rotation and signed unexpected accruals beyond the initial year of rotation. Although some reduction in income increasing unexpected accruals is detected up to six years post partner rotation, the magnitude of this effect declines monotonically. When tests of conservatism are conducted using lengthened post-rotation intervals, we find some evidence of continued conservatism, but again this is generally (though not monotonically) reducing as the post-rotation interval is lengthened.
Partner versus firm rotation
Our focus in this paper is on the contemporaneous effects of audit partner rotation, as distinct from much earlier evidence on the effects of audit firm rotation. In our primary analysis, we simply compare attributes of audited accounting data at the time of partner rotation with all other firm years. Partner rotation is identified as a switch of audit partner without a corresponding switch of audit firm. Hence, the possible effect of audit firm switches being left in our "non-switch" sample of firm years warrants some investigation. To ensure our results are not affected by firm switches, we repeat our tests on a sample that excludes all firm-years that have changed audit firm in the current year. This is a means of examining the possible effect of partner rotation without an offsetting effect of firm switches. However, all of our results reported in Tables 3, 4 and 5 are robust to this change.
Conclusion
Although the mandatory rotation of audit partners has now become compulsory in the US, Australia and many other jurisdictions, there is remarkably little evidence on which this policy has been based, While there are several studies that examine the possible effects of audit firm rotation (a policy rejected by most regulators and strongly resisted by the accounting profession), these results are mixed and do not necessarily inform debate about the desirability of partner rotation. Our paper takes advantage of long-standing Australian requirements that the signing partner must sign by name, rather than simply by firm. Hence, we are able to isolate instances of partner change absent any audit firm change. These changes are likely to be largely a result of some form of partner rotation.
Consistent with professional requirements introduced from 2001, we find partner rotation has increased over the 1998-2003 period. We find that although the magnitude of unexpected accruals (our proxy for earnings quality) is not significantly different in rotation years, there is a significantly lower (more negative/less positive) signed unexpected accrual in the year that rotation occurs. Further investigation shows that this result is driven by a reduction where unexpected accruals are positive, rather than negative. We interpret this as evidence that partner rotation acts to constrain otherwise aggressive accounting (i.e., it is associated with increased conservatism).
We provide further evidence by directly testing for incrementally more asymmetric recognition of "economic losses" using two distinct methods from Basu (1997) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005) , and find that when partner rotation occurs, contemporaneous earnings are incrementally more conservative.
Notably, in the majority of our tests only clients of Big 5 audit firms that rotate partner display more conservative contemporaneous earnings than non-rotating firms.
Evidence that partner rotation is associated with increased conservatism is therefore largely restricted to Big 5 auditors. This lends some support to the argument that partner rotation should be applied differentially to clients of large and small audit firms. While these findings need to be tempered against the limitations of drawing inferences about aggressive accounting using accrual proxies and the models used to test for conservatism, we have carried out supplementary analysis that supports our primary findings. In particular, the triangulation of the unexpected accrual based results and the conservatism tests adds strength to our findings.
All these results are concentrated in the latter half of our sample period (i.e., [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] , when partner rotation was a professional requirement and there was very active legislative and regulatory attention given to this issue, and the accounting profession as a whole. Hence, we conclude that partner rotation could be useful in constraining otherwise aggressive accounting, but this effect is at least in part a reflection of professional and regulatory pressures. $27, 140, 500 $4, 891, 092, 915 3, 041 $545, 595, 258 $28, 446, 952 $3, 253, 725, 857, 916 $21, 104, 464 $3, 178, 557, 342 3, 041 $442, 370, 678 $21, 883, 305 $2, 265, 473, = Unexpected accruals estimated using the performance model in year t PSWITCH = 1 if partner switch (within audit firm) has occurred in year t; else = 0 B5 = 1 if audit firm is a Big 5 audit firm in year t; else = 0 CFO = Cash flow from operations in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1 LMVE = log of the market value of equity in year t LEV = Ratio of total liabilities to total assets in year t EISSUE = 1 if the firm has issued equity in year t; else = 0 MERGER = 1 if the firm has been involved in a merger in year t; else = 0 MKTBK = market value of equity divided by book value of equity in year t TOP20 = Percentage of firm owned by Top 20 shareholders in year t LOSS = 1 if operating income is less than 0 in year t; else = 0 MRET = Fiscal year share return adjusted for the All Ordinary Index in year t LAGTACC = Total accruals in year t-1 scaled by total assets in year t-2 c *** Significant at 1% level = 1 if audit firm is a Big 5 audit firm in year t; else = 0 CFO = Cash flow from operations in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1 LMVE = log of the market value of equity in year t LEV = Ratio of total liabilities to total assets in year t EISSUE = 1 if the firm has issued equity in year t; else = 0 MERGER = 1 if the firm has been involved in a merger in year t; else = 0 MKTBK = market value of equity divided by book value of equity in year t TOP20 = Percentage of firm owned by Top 20 shareholders in year t LOSS = 1 if operating income is less than 0 in year t; else = 0 MRET = Fiscal year share return adjusted for the All Ordinary Index in year t LAGTACC = Total accruals in year t-1 scaled by total assets in year t-2 *** Significant at 1% level = Operating Income in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1 DRET = 1 if MRET in year t is less than 0; else = 0 MRET = Fiscal year share return adjusted for the All Ordinary Index in year t PSWITCH = 1 if partner switch (within firm) has occurred in the current year; else = 0 *** Significant at 1% level = Operating income minus cash from operations in year t, scaled by total assets in year t-1 DCFO = 1 if CFO in year t < 0; else 0 CFO = Cash from operations in year t scaled by total assets in year t-1 PSWITCH = 1 if partner switch (within audit firm) has occurred in the current year; else = 0 *** Significant at 1% level
